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ABSTRACT 
 Since August 2008, Russia has increased the use of soft power tactics in Georgia. 
Disinformation, propaganda, and fake news have become part of the everyday narrative 
spread by Russian media. Many scholars have studied Russian soft power and concluded 
that it mainly targeted Georgia after that country’s strong intention toward integration 
with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s 
aim was to alter public opinion of Georgia and threaten the country’s image in the 
international society. However, one vulnerable region in northeastern Georgia has not 
received much attention. This study takes a closer look at Pankisi Gorge, a valley that 
borders Russia’s breakaway republic of Chechnya and populated mostly with ethnic Kists 
of the Islamic faith. Through the analysis of Russian media stories about Pankisi, this 
thesis finds that the valley is often presented as a “nest of terrorism,” creating a false 
sense of threat in the entire region. Additionally, this thesis discusses how Russia can 
destabilize Pankisi through fake news and actually use the situation for its possible 
military intervention in Georgia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 RUSSIA’S HYBRID WARFARE IN GEORGIA 
Russia actively uses tactics such as disseminating false statements that cause fear 
as well as manipulating social opinion to influence important processes. This is 
deliberately conducted through fake news, distorted facts, and falsification of history. 
Many times, they combine these methods with the use military force to intimidate their 
adversaries, creating a hybrid-warfare model. Used in tandem, these methods polarize the 
population, which challenges a country’s security and integrity.  
Specifically, in August 2008, during the Russian-Georgian military conflict in 
South Ossetia, Georgia, became a test ground for Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics, 
from increasing military presence to cyber-attacks, disinformation, and propaganda. 
Russia blocked the websites of the Georgian government, as well as spread false 
information about Georgia’s activities during the conflict, with the goal of undermining 
the country’s international image. 
This thesis examines Russia’s use of hybrid warfare techniques in Georgia, 
specifically in Pankisi Gorge, as an example to demonstrate how well-planned 
disinformation and propaganda campaigns can engender instability in a country and how 
targeted messages related to certain Georgian regions can cause serious damage to a 
country’s international image. The research contributes to understanding Russia’s policy 
and hybrid warfare techniques. It can also help to provide the Georgian government with 
a specific, complex, and systemic approach to the problem of Russia’s hybrid warfare, 
with an emphasis on methods and strategies used in Pankisi Gorge against the ethnic 
minorities. The case study in this thesis includes analysis and demonstrates challenges 
that might be interesting for representatives of the security sectors not only in Georgia but 
in other countries that face similar problems. It provides an excellent opportunity for the 
interested audience to observe the situation on the ground, analyze the best practices and 
the mistakes made by Georgia, so that others can avoid similar problems in their own 
countries.  
2 
 SIGNIFICANCE OF PANKISI GORGE 
Pankisi Gorge has been selected as a target region and subject for the case study 
for several reasons. Firstly, the residents of this region represent ethnic and religious 
minorities, and therefore, they are among the most vulnerable parts of the Georgian 
population and face challenges with socio-economic integration in the society. Secondly, 
Pankisi Gorge, which borders Russia, is a valley region in northeast Georgia with a 
mostly Muslim and ethnically Kist population of Chechen roots. Refugees arrived in 
Pankisi after the war in Chechnya in 1999, and since then some moved to Russia, Turkey, 
and Azerbaijan, but many stayed and still live in the valley.1 In the early 2000s, with the 
rise of Chechen refugees, there was an increase of criminal activities in Pankisi Gorge, as 
Elena Pokalova has written, mainly “connected to North Caucasus insurgencies.”2 After 
the 9/11 attacks the United States announced sending about 150 military trainers to 
Georgia.3 In 2002, Washington warned that Arab fighters allied with al-Qaeda were 
living in Pankisi Gorge. As former U.S. diplomat Philip Remler noted, “The Pankisi 
Gorge is an extremely dangerous place for Georgia.”4 The same year, Vladimir Putin 
accused the Georgian government of inaction and sent an aircraft to bomb the Pankisi 
Gorge. Pressured by Russia, the Georgian government sent troops and took full control of 
the valley.  
Thirdly, after refugees arrived in Pankisi Gorge because of a second war between 
Russia and Chechnya in 1999, Wahhabism gained many followers in the region.5 In 
recent years more than 100 young people have left to fight as terrorists in Syria. As of 
                                                 
1 Niel Arun, “Russia’s Reach Unnerves Chechens, Europe,” BBC, last modified January 16, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7189024.stm. 11/24/2020 8:00:00 AM 
2 Elena Pokalova, “Georgia, Terrorism, and Foreign Fighters,” Special Operations Journal 4, no. 2 
(November 2018): 146–168, https://doi.org/10.1080/23296151.2018.1510707. 
3 Paul Quinn-Judge, “The Surprise in the Gorge: Al-Qaeda Flourishes in Far-off Spots, as the 
Discovery of an Enclave Shows,” TIME, October 20, 2002, https://web.archive.org/web/20040826110122/ 
http:/www.time.com/time/covers/1101021028/wgeorgia.html.  
4 Pokalova, “Georgia, Terrorism, and Foreign Fighters,”146-167. 
5 Christopher M. Blanchard, The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya, CRS Report No. 
RS21695 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 4, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf. 
3 
2019, over 33 fighters from Pankisi have died in Syria, including some well-known 
terrorist figures such as the key commander of the Islamic State, Omar al-Shishani. News 
stories about Pankisi Gorge and terrorism have covered local and international media. 
The image of the nest of terrorism, combined with the high unemployment rate, and the 
challenges of integration cause a lot of frustration among locals in Pankisi Gorge and 
make it a region vulnerable to destabilization. Russia capitalizes on this fragile situation 
in part by spreading disinformation, and creates a basis for future justification of its 
possible intervention in Georgia through Pankisi Gorge.  
 OVERVIEW 
In addition to the introduction, this thesis consists of a literature review, presented 
in Chapter II, and four additional chapters. Chapter III offers a general overview of the 
country of Georgia and Pankisi Gorge. Chapter IV analyzes Russia’s use of hybrid 
warfare against Pankisi and the country as a whole. The methodology and results of 
content analysis are presented in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI looks into the possibility 
of Russia using instability for its national imperialistic interests and influence expansion 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 HYBRID WARFARE 
In the 21st century, propaganda, disinformation, cyber-attacks, and special forces 
have become part of war, blurring the lines of traditional warfare. A number of scholars, 
most notably, Frank Hoffman, now characterize several past military conflicts as 
examples of hybrid warfare. In 2007, Hoffman analyzed the complicated nature of 
modern conflicts and concluded that contingencies in the future would be hybrid threats 
aimed at the country’s vulnerabilities.6 As Hoffman writes, “Hybrid threats incorporate a 
full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular 
tactics and formations, terrorist acts, including indiscriminate violence and coercion and 
criminal disorder.”7 Nations, according to Hoffman, would simultaneously use different 
tactics and approaches, and the lines among various modes of war would become 
blurrier.8 Yet, Hoffman’s explanation lacks an emphasis on the importance of 
information warfare as an aspect of hybrid techniques, which we discuss later in this 
literature review. 
Based on analysis of ancient and more recent wars, Peter R. Mansoor writes that 
hybrid warfare did not begin with more modern conflicts. The Helot uprising in the war 
between Athens and Sparta added “irregular dimension to the conventional conflict” 
because Spartans did not have any experience with Helots, felt uneasy, and made 
mistakes.9 According to Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, during the French 
and Indian War in 1755–1763 both sides used hybrid warfare, such as a combination of 
native irregulars, colonial militias, and regular forces. Likewise, in World War II, the 
                                                 
6  Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 58−59, 
https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf. 
7 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 8.  
8 Hoffman, 57.  
9 Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the 
Ancient World to the Present, 1st ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 4.  
6 
German army had to deal with constant disruptions to its communication lines caused by 
the activity of Soviet partisans.10 Years later, after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. forces used 
hybrid warfare to attack Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan. According to 
Mansoor, the use of hybrid warfare was successful in destroying Taliban formation, but 
was less effective in terms of pursuing Al-Qaeda remnants in the mountains. While 
Hoffman agrees that hybrid warfare is not new, Western military thinkers in the United 
States have been slow in recognizing the change and developing institutional toolset. As 
Hoffman writes, “we overlooked what really constituted a threat to our national security 
interests.”11 Both Mansoor and Hoffman agree that events such as the 2006 Israel-
Lebanon war and the 9/11 attacks have changed the perception of hybrid warfare and 
emphasized its asymmetrical nature.12 But Hoffman also mentions that technology 
creates a chance for further development of hybrid warfare. According to him, the main 
challenge in the future would be how to deal with those states that use different 
technologies and techniques in innovative ways to achieve their goals. Hoffman writes 
that “this could include states blending high-tech capabilities such as antisatellite 
weapons with terrorism and cyber warfare directed against financial targets”.13 
 RUSSIA’S HYBRID WARFARE AGAINST POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES 
A number of researchers such as Tracey German, James K. Wither, and Greg 
Simons, argue that the goal of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet region, including 
Georgia, is to preserve and increase its influence, while limiting the reach of any foreign 
country or military alliance.14 In fact, there is a body of literature that discusses Russia’s 
                                                 
10 Murray and Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare, 4.  
11 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 13.  
12 Mehmet Erol Seyfettin and Safak Oguz, “Hybrid Warfare Studies and Russia’s Example in 
Crimea,” Gazi Akademik Bakis 9, no.17 (November 2015): 262, https://DOI:10.19060/gab.22813.  
13 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Small Wars Journal, 52 (1st quarter 2009): 
4, https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf. 
14 Tracey German, “Securing the South Caucasus: Military Aspects of Russian Policy towards the 




techniques for destabilization in different post-Soviet countries. These studies are built on 
the assumption that Russia uses traditional warfare methods together with irregular 
activities, such as propaganda, disinformation, and cyber warfare, to increase its 
influence and gain more power, as well as alter public opinion in these countries. The 
entire post-Soviet zone represents a vital element for the Kremlin's security and 
political/economic interests. For the Russian Federation, the Southern Caucasus 
embodies a buffer zone, where limiting the influence of any foreign power will guarantee 
the security in the Northern Caucasus. Additionally, the Southern Caucasus could serve 
as an alternative route for energy and goods to European countries and attaining control 
over this region will be necessary for Russia to preserve and broaden its energy markets. 
To achieve all the aforementioned goals, Russia is using the methods described as hybrid 
warfare.  
The subject of hybrid warfare has received even more attention since Russia 
initiated its occupation of Crimea in 2014. A number of scholars such as András Rácz, 
James K. Wither, Mehmet Seyfettin, and Safak Oguz have analyzed the case and discuss 
the different methods that Russia has used against Ukraine. Wither, a professor and a 
retired British army officer, wrote that in 2014 Russia’s techniques against Ukraine were 
a mix of conventional and irregular methods, and “sponsorship of political protests, 
economic coercion, cyber operations and, in particular, an intense disinformation 
campaign.”15 Similar to Crimea, Wither considers the Georgian-Russian war as another 
example of hybrid warfare. He writes that Russia used its regular armed forces together 
with Abkhazian and South Ossetian militants and, additionally, special operations forces 
that were acting as “local defense troops.”16 Following the same ideas as Wither, 
Seyfettin and Oğuz write that apart from military activities, Russia’s strategy in Crimea 
was highly based on irregular warfare, such as creating a resistance movement against 
local governments as well as eliminating the pro-Maidan protests in Crimea through 
                                                 
15 James K. Wither, “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 
2 (Spring 2016): 76, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26326441?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.  
16 Wither, “Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare,” 75. 
8 
intimidation and threats.17 András Rácz discusses the emergence of a mass of literature 
following the Kremlin narrative as one of the key factors. According to him, in this 
literature Ukrainians are presented as nationalists and radicals, while events at 
Euromaidan as “an American plot.”18 Russia uses the same methods of disinformation in 
Georgia as well through creating a stereotype of Pankisi Gorge as a “lair of terrorism.”19 
Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, et al. have also studied 
Russia’s approaches and operations in its conflict with Ukraine. They discuss how Russia 
annexed Crimea, factors that contributed to its success and shortcomings, as well as the 
characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine operation, including information campaigns and 
cyber warfare. But Kofman et al. do not agree with those scholars who described the 
conflict that happened in Eastern Ukraine as the example of hybrid warfare, as Kofman 
and his colleagues write, “rather, the conflict from February to August cycled through 
four different types of warfare: political, irregular, hybrid, and conventional.”20 They 
argue that there are no signs that Russia intended to use hybrid warfare; instead, it was an 
improvisation on the resistance that came from Ukraine and its forces. Towards the end 
Russia turned to conventional methods, as it could not reach its goals solely with hybrid 
warfare.21 Kofman et al. write that “the policy imperatives in Ukraine were such that 
Russian leaders proved eventually willing to pay a high political, economic, and military 
price.”22 
                                                 
17 Seyfettin and Oguz, “Hybrid Warfare,” 271.  
18 András Racz, Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist (Finland: The 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015), 53, https://stratcomcoe.org/andras-racz-russias-hybrid-war-
ukraine-breaking-enemys-ability-resist. 
19 Anastasia Antidze, “Панкисское нашествие Это грузинское ущелье называют логовом 
террористов Здесь по своим законам живут чеченцы, Закавказье” [Pankisian invasion, this Georgian 
gorge are calling the den of terrorists, here the Chechens live by their own laws Transcaucasia], Lenta, May 
2, 2019, https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/05/02/pankis/. 
20 Michael Kofman     et al., Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 87, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html. 
21 Kofman et al., 88. 
22 Kofman et al., 88. 
9 
Instead of focusing on one country, Radin and Simons expanded their research to 
the Balkan region.23 They analyze different irregular methods that Russia has used 
including political, economic, and energy pressure mechanisms; soft power instruments 
such as propaganda; intelligence and the so-called "active measures," as well as PSYOPS 
and cyber operations. A number of scholars such as Seyfettin and Oğuz, Ronald J. 
Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and Masashi Crete Nishihata have also analyzed the use of 
cyber technology by Russia. Seyfettin and Oğuz write that in 2014, Ukraine accused 
Russia of hacking news websites, spreading propaganda messages through social media, 
and disrupting communication systems.24 Deibert et al. focus their research on the 
Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and conclude that government websites and Internet 
resources were under cyber-attacks and part of them originated from Russia.25  
Scholars such as James K. Wither, Catherine A. Theohary, and Rod Thorton 
emphasize the importance and power of information warfare as an aspect of hybrid 
techniques. As Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Aleksandr Burutin said in 
February 2008, “Wars of the future will be information wars.”26 According to Theohary, 
a specialist in National Security Policy, Cyber and Information Operations, “information 
warfare (IW) is the range of military and government operations to protect and exploit the 
information environment.”27 It includes propaganda, misinformation and disinformation.  
Researchers Tracey German, Eve Hunter and Piret Pernik, and Kavus Abushov 
have also analyzed the effects of Russian hybrid warfare on the entire region and even the 
international community. All these scholars follow the idea that by hybrid warfare, 
                                                 
23 Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses, (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2017), 1–5, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1577.html. 
24 Seyfettin and Oguz, “Hybrid Warfare,” 272.  
25 Ronald J. Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and Masahi Crete-Nishihata, “Cyclones in Cyberspace: 
Information Shaping and Denial in the 2008 Russia–Georgia War,” Security Dialogue 43, no. 1 (February 
2012): 3–24, rb.gy/kba3bd. 
26 Lionel Beehner, Analyzing the Russian Way of War. Evidence from 2008 conflict in Georgia, (West 
Point: The Modern War Institute, 2018), 59, https://mwi.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Analyzing-
the-Russian-Way-of-War.pdf. 
27 Catherine A. Theohary, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R45142. 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45142.pdf. 
10 
Russia wants to maintain power in the region and disturb European integration of target 
countries such as Georgia and Ukraine. According to German, after war with Georgia in 
2008, Russia reestablished itself as a major actor in the South Caucasus by increasing its 
military presence and establishing permanent military bases in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.28 While citing Edward Lucas, Hunter and Pernik wrote that through hybrid war 
Russia wants to recreate what once was a Russian empire, hinder the EU from controlling 
energy pipelines, and make sure that the West is weaker and divided.29 With increasing 
military presence Russia limits the access of NATO in the region. As Abushov writes, 
“Meanwhile, it seems that the existence of the ethno-territorial conflicts in Georgia 
assures its exclusion from NATO, since the alliance would not be prepared to allow 
Tbilisi to join when the ethno-territorial conflicts are not close to a resolution.”30  
 RUSSIA’S USE OF HYBRID WARFARE IN GEORGIA  
Several Georgian authors, such as Otarashvili, Menabde and Lomtadze agree that 
Georgia is of a particular interest to Russia, because of its history, geopolitical location, 
and its aspirations to join the NATO and the EU. Russia advocates its national interests in 
the Black Sea–Caucasus region partially by consistent expansion of its military presence 
in the area.31 In particular, Russia uses the military bases in Georgia’s occupied territories 
(7th military base in Abkhazia and 4th military base in South Ossetia) and in Armenia 
(102nd military base), as well as its increased capabilities in the Black Sea after the 
annexation of the Crimea Peninsula, to significantly limit US/NATO access and establish 
itself as a dominant power. The Deputy Secretary of Georgia’s National Security 
Council, Teona Akubardia, said in an interview in February 2020 that “Russia’s moves to 
                                                 
28 German, “Securing the South Caucasus,” 2.  
29 Eve Hunter and Piret Pernik, “The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare,” International Centre for Defence 
and Security, April 2015, 3, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2013/Eve_Hunter__Piret_Pernik_-
_Challenges_of_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf. 
30 Kavus Abushov, “Policing the near Abroad: Russian Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus,” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (June 2009): 206, https://www-tandfonline-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10357710902895129. 
31 Giorgi Menabde, “Russia Boosts Its Military Contingent in Georgia’s Occupied Territories,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 22 (February 2020), https://jamestown.org/program/russia-boosts-its-
military-contingent-in-georgias-occupied-territories/. 
11 
strengthen its illegal military bases in Georgia’s occupied regions, the deployments of 
new weapons and military personnel there, as well as intensive military training should 
be seen as part of the Kremlin’s revisionist policies.”32  
In addition to increasing its military presence, Russia actively uses the so-called 
soft power policy, which aims to alter Georgia’s pro-Western public opinion. For the 
Kremlin, it is a major precondition to change Georgia’s foreign policy vector. In 2017, in 
its new Strategic Defense Review Georgia for the first time identified Russia’s soft power 
as a major threat to its security. According to the document, Russia’s soft power aims to 
weaken state institutions, strengthen pro-Russian civil and political movements, and 
discredit pro-Western foreign policy agenda.33 Georgian scholars such as Elene 
Panchulidze, Giorgi Lomtadze, and Tamar Kintsurashvili have studied Russia’s use of 
soft power in Georgia. According to Panchulidze, when it comes to Georgia, Russia uses 
techniques that include: Russian government agencies and state-funded media; cyber 
activity; paid social media users and third party intermediaries.34 
Additionally, according to Lomtadze, in Georgia, Russia’s soft power is partially 
based on Georgia’s cultural and historic ties to Russia.35 In that regard, Greg Simons 
takes a similar tack, drawing from his research on the Balkan States, he concludes that 
Russia’s approach to soft power changes based on the target audience. As he writes, 
“Beyond the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia attempts to project its 
attractive elements, such as sport, education, arts and culture.”36 Simons also emphasizes 
the importance of Russian-language population in the target country. In Georgia, the 
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percentage of ethnic Russians is just 1.5%. Nevertheless, according to a Caucasus 
Research Resource Center (CRRC) study conducted in 2013, 70% of the population has a 
good command of the Russian language.37  
While Russia’s hybrid warfare is thoroughly studied in Ukraine and the Balkan 
Region, only a few scholars have analyzed the different methods used in Georgia. Almost 
nothing has been written about Russia’s efforts to spread disinformation about Pankisi 
Gorge and create the image of a region that constantly hides terrorists. Yet the experts 
have long talked about how Russia could successfully use Pankisi Gorge as a 
manipulation tool against Georgia. Through analyzing Russian media sources, this thesis 
aims to provide an insight into Russia’s tactics used against Pankisi and become a basis 
for creating an effective counter propaganda policy.  
 RESEARCH DESIGN  
Through a review of the existing literature and the analysis of Russian media 
sources the thesis explores how Russia uses hybrid warfare in Georgia and specifically in 
Pankisi Gorge. The following chapters look into Russia’s use of different tools to spread 
disinformation and propaganda and analyze why and how destabilization of the country 
serves Russia’s national imperialistic interests and its influence expansion throughout 
Georgia and the region in whole.  
The thesis demonstrates specific tools and techniques that Russia uses to create a 
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III. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE COUNTRY OF GEORGIA 
AND ITS REGIONS 
Georgia is located in the South Caucasus, between the Black and Caspian seas, on 
the crossroads of Europe and Asia. Situated on a strategically important region, its 
neighbors include Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. With a population of a little 
over 4 million people, Georgia’s native language is Georgian, which dates back to the 
fifth century.38 Christianity became a state religion in the 330s. (See Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Physical map of Georgia.39 
The modern territory of Georgia was formerly known as the kingdoms of Colchis 
and Kartli-Iberia. There was a strong Roman influence in the first centuries A.D. In 1783, 
Georgia and the Russian Empire signed the Treaty of Georgievsk, after many years of 
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Turkish and Persian domination and Georgia’s Golden Age from the 11th to 13th 
centuries.40 The agreement was concluded by Russia’s Catherine II and King Erekle II of 
Eastern Georgia, and it guaranteed Georgia’s territorial integrity in return for Russia’s 
ability to conduct the country’s foreign affairs.41 King Erekle II chose Russia over 
Muslim Persia mainly because of shared religious beliefs. According to Lasha 
Markozashvili and Tinatin Dvalishvili, in fact, this partnership did not turn out to be 
useful for Georgia, and after Erekle II died “Russia initiated a long-lasting military 
occupation.”42 Much later, Georgia was an independent state from 1918 to 1921. On 
February 25, 1921, Georgia became part of the Russian Soviet Empire after the Red 
Army invasion. The following years brought repression, restriction of political activities, 
executions of innocent people, imprisonments, and exile. Jimsher Rekhviashvili from 
Radio Free Liberty’s Georgian bureau writes that “Soviet occupation started on February 
25 and lasted over 70 years.”43 
 INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GEORGIAN-
ABKHAZIAN CONFLICT 
In 1989 Georgia declared its sovereignty and two years later reached 
independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union.44 The independence was followed 
by instability and civil war in 1990s. As a result, the first post-independent government 
with the first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia was overthrown. Two regions, South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, became hotspots for the emergence of separatist movements.45 As German 
writes, “[a] renewed upsurge of Georgian nationalism during Mikhail Gorbachev’s era of 
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perestroika increased inter-ethnic tensions within the Soviet republic.”46 Eventually, in 
1992, ethnic tensions in Abkhazia turned into a war and a conflict that still remains 
unresolved.47  
Abkhazia occupies the northwest region of Georgia that borders Russia and the 
Black Sea. During Stalin’s rule, many Georgians resettled in the region “leading to 
Abkhaz fears of losing their homeland.”48 In the years 1956, 1967, and 1978 Abkhaz 
leaders requested from Moscow to incorporate the region into Russia. In 1989 there was a 
mass assembly of 30,000 Abkhaz separatists that included Greeks, Armenians, Russians, 
and some ethnic Georgians. They demanded to restore Abkhazia’s 1925 constitution from 
the time when the region was a sovereign Soviet Republic. This assembly was followed 
by anti-Abkhazian mass demonstrations in Tbilisi. Soon these rallies turned against the 
Soviet Union and demanded Georgia’s independence. Nineteen people died on April 9, 
1989, when the Soviet troops attacked the demonstrators in Tbilisi with toxic gas and 
sharpened digging tools.49 April 9 remains a day of grief in Georgia, and a reminder of 
the Soviet occupation.  
As the Soviet Union collapsed, Abkhazians took part in the Soviet referendum of 
1991 on whether to preserve the unity of the USSR, despite the fact that the government 
in Georgia’s capital Tbilisi forbade the citizens to participate in such referendums.50 In 
1992 an armed conflict erupted in Abkhazia that claimed the lives of over 15,000 people 
                                                 
46 Tracey German, “Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Collision of Georgian and Russian Interests,” 
French Institute of International Relations (June 2006): 6, 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/germananglais.pdf. 
47 Amos Chapple, “The War for Abkhazia: 25 Years Later,” Radio Free Europe, August 23, 2017, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/twenty-five-years-on-from-the-start-of-the-abkhaz-war/28690617.html. 
48 Alexandros Petersen, “The 1992–93 Georgia-Abkhazia War: A Forgotten Conflict,” Caucasian 
Review of International Affairs 2, no. 4. (Autumn 2008): 190, http://cria-
online.org/Journal/5/THE%201992-93%20GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA%20WAR.pdf.  
49 Petersen, 192. 
50 Petersen, 195. 
16 
and lasted more than a year.51 Abkhazia won the war and claimed de facto independence 
from Georgia. There were major demographic changes in the region that triggered claims 
of ethnic cleansing from Tbilisi. Over 300,000 ethnic Georgians were displaced during 
the war and most of them have never been able to return to Abkhazia.52  
A number of reports discuss Russia’s role and interference in the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict. According to Human Rights Watch, there were many outsiders 
participating in the war. These were the fighters who were not residents of Georgia 
before the conflict and they mainly came from southern Russia. The conflict was lightly 
armed until Russia provided Abkhazians with armor and heavy artillery between October 
and December 1992. According to Human Rights Watch, it left “little room for any 
conclusion except that some parties, within the Russian forces, decided to supply the 
Abkhaz.”53 It was a violation of international law and a clear intervention in the 
conflict.54 Today, Abkhazia is a self-declared sovereign state closely tied to Russia in 
terms of economy and tourism. Many Abkhazians have been provided with Russian 
passports. Some scholars, such as German, think that this gives Russia a chance to cite 
the security of its citizens for past or future possible interventions in the region.55 In 
addition, the Abkhazian seaside is full of Russian tourists year after year, and Russian 
banks in Abkhazia are accused of money laundering in the region by Georgia.56   
After the war was over, the former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Georgian Communist Party, Eduard Shevardnadze, became Georgia’s president in 
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1995.57 Seven years after he assumed the presidency, the public could no longer tolerate 
the corruption and lack of effective government services, which was followed by an 
effort to manipulate elections in November 2003.58 Demonstrations emerged in Georgia’s 
capital of Tbilisi. Shevardnadze resigned in the midst of the so-called “Rose Revolution” 
lead by the young opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili, who later became the third 
president of Georgia.59  
 SOUTH OSSETIA 
In 2006, Georgia demanded Russia remove its troops from South Ossetia, another 
separatist region in South-Central Georgia; the troops had been based there since 1991. In 
1989 South Ossetia “lobbied for joining its territory with North Ossetia in Russia or for 
independence.”60 The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia resulted in the 
displacement of tens of thousands of people. Russia mediated a ceasefire agreement, 
which the parties agreed to and allowed Russia to station “peacekeepers” in the region. 
Also in 2006, separatists from South Ossetia reported that over 99% of voters voted for 
independence from Georgia in a referendum.61 As Jim Nichol writes, “during the latter 
half of July 2008, Russia conducted a military exercise that proved to be a rehearsal for 
Russian actions in Georgia a few weeks later.”62 Beyond the military exercise, the police 
chief of a local South Ossetian village was killed in a bomb attack and Russian military 
planes violated Georgian airspace over the region. 
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In August of 2008, President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili sent troops to South 
Ossetia, a move which was followed by Russia’s air strikes.63 The “August War” lasted 
for five days and claimed the lives of 170 Georgian servicemen, 14 policemen, and 228 
civilians. According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), “In many places 
throughout the country it caused serious destruction, reaching levels of utter devastation 
in a number of towns and villages.”64 The Atlantic Council wrote that “The 2008 
Georgian War was Russia’s first successful military action outside of its borders since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.”65 While a report from the EU placed blame on both 
countries, saying that Georgia attacked the separatists in South Ossetia, which 
Saakashvili’s government considered an act of defense. Russia, on its part, created 
conditions that led to war by encouraging separatist movements and conducting military 
trainings.66 Later, Vladimir Putin confirmed that the invasion plan for South Ossetia was 
created in 2006–2007, before the conflict even escalated in summer of 2008.67 
Today, the United States and NATO recognize South Ossetia as Georgian 
territory. Only Russia, Venezuela, Syria, and Nicaragua recognize the region as an 
independent state.68 In 2011, Russia put up fences and barbed wire to mark borders 
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across the region. As Remi Kumin writes, “now, Georgians cannot come within 200 
meters of the border or risk being kidnapped, detained and fined.”69  
 RUSSIAN-CHECHEN CONFLICTS AND PANKISI GORGE 
Recently a third region in Georgia, Pankisi Gorge, inhabited by a Muslim 
minority, has become an area where Russia uses hybrid warfare techniques. Pankisi 
Gorge borders Chechnya, which has a long history with Russia. (See Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Pankisi Gorge70 
The Russian-Chechen conflict originates from the time before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, when part of Chechen society, like most post-soviet republics, felt that it 
was inevitable that the regime would break down and expressed a claim to independence. 
In November 1990, the general national assembly was held the city of Grozny, where 
“The National Congress” was elected under the leadership of Soviet Air Forces general 
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Jokhar Dudayev. In September 1991, the congress declared the independence of the 
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI). In the elections held on  October 27, 1991, J. 
Dudayev was elected as president with 90% of the vote while the local government 
assigned by the official Moscow was declared illegal. It is claimed that the idea of 
fighting for independence based on Chechen ethnicity/nationality is related to J. 
Dudayev’s name.71  
Russia’s increased interest in Pankisi Gorge dates back to the end of the 20th and 
beginning of the 21st century, when the country declared that it was actively fighting 
terrorism. In 1999, the Georgian government struggled to control Pankisi Gorge, where 
thousands of Chechen refugees had moved since the beginning of second war in 
Chechnya. At the time, criminal activities were on the rise, including kidnapping, drug 
trafficking, and murder.72 
There were two wars between Russia and Chechnya. The first war in 1994–1995 
ended up with Chechnya’s de facto independence from Russia. The prerequisite of the 
Second Russian-Chechen war was the infiltration of Shamil Basayev, Chechen fighter 
and politician, and al-Khattab fighters to Dagestan in August 1999, as well as house 
explosions in several cities in Russia.73 Even though the government of Chechnya 
categorically separated itself from these terrorist attacks, it refused to transfer Basayev to 
the Russian side, which was successfully used by Moscow to send troops to Chechnya.74 
Officially, Moscow formally evaluates the second Chechen campaign as “counter-
terrorist operations” on the territories of the North Caucasian region. The active phase 
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took place in 1999–2000 and was completed in March 2000 by taking the city of Grozny. 
In those years, Russia actively created a narrative about Chechens as terrorists and still 
continues to do so in Pankisi Gorge.75  
During the second war in Chechnya, in 1999 President Vladimir Putin requested 
Georgia to allow Russian troops to follow Chechen rebels trying to escape into Georgia. 
Instead, as the second Russian-Chechnian war escalated in late 1999, Georgia allowed 
Chechen refugees and rebels to settle in Pankisi Gorge as long as they remained 
peaceful.76 After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the United States became interested in Pankisi 
reportedly because “a phone call was made from a Bin Laden operative in Afghanistan to 
Georgia announcing the success of the first phase of attacks.”77 The same year Russia 
dropped a bomb in the valley. It also threatened to intervene in Pankisi Gorge, arguing 
that international terrorists and Chechen rebels were based there.78 In 2002, Putin also 
sent a letter to the world leaders, including UN secretary General Kofi Annan, saying that 
Georgia was harboring terrorists.79 Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze called the 
announcement “hasty.” According to Wikto-Mach Dobroslawa, “the accusations of 
terrorist activities, links with Al-Qaeda, and of the functioning of the training camps for 
jihadists in Pankisi were raised by the Russian authorities and led to Moscow’s direct 
engagement in this Georgian region.”80 With increased pressure from the United States, 
Georgia deployed military forces to the Gorge after 60 Chechen guerillas attacked 
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Russian forces north of the Georgian border and took control of the region. In 2003, the 
United States said there were three Chechen groups in Pankisi that were terrorist 
organizations. Nevertheless, that did not “give leave” to Russia to violate Georgia’s 
sovereignty.81 After the second Chechen war, Georgia accepted up to 5,000 refugees 
(according to some sources as many as 7,800 to 8,000), including Kists who were born in 
Georgia and had gone to Chechnya for work, study, or living.82 A large part of refugee 
population managed to go to Europe with the involvement of the UNCHR and some 
stayed in Pankisi Gorge. 
 RADICAL ISLAM AND PANKISI GORGE 
Home to a Muslim minority, Pankisi Gorge is located in Eastern Georgia, in 
Kakheti region. Spread of Islam in this region has its cultural and historic prerequisites. 
Before Chechen refugees came to Pankisi, the population here was mainly Christian.83 
Today, most of the population consists of Muslim descendants of the Chechens called 
Kists. Throughout the years, Chechen-speaking Kists adopted Georgian traditions, 
learned the Georgian language, and became part of the history and the society. Within 
this region, Georgian Christians have become a minority. As Professor Rebecca Gould of 
Birmingham University writes, “while many Kists subscribe to various secularisms that 
became normative in Soviet times, religious faith persists into the present, and at an 
unprecedented level.”84 
Gould also writes that war-time migration of Chechen refugees changed the 
character of Islam in Pankisi Gorge. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Islam in 
Pankisi co-existed with Christianity, converging into some of its styles of worship. 
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According to Gould, “a survey of the history and ethnography of Pankisi demonstrates 
the region’s startling capacity for assimilation: of Chechen to Georgian, Islamic to 
Christian, and Sunni to Shia.”85 Some scholars attribute the spread of Wahabism in 
Pankisi Gorge to the war in Chechnya. As S. Ozeren, I. D. Gunes, and D. M. Al-
Badayneh write, “wahhabism was preached by the youth returned from the war.”86 
According to Tinatin Kapanadze and Giorgi Goguadze, Wahabism spread in Pankisi 
Gorge in the 1990s. Considered an extremist branch of the Muslim religion, Wahhabism 
goes back to mid-18th century Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism goes against traditional Islam 
and has elements that are not written of in the Koran. As Gould writes, “Wahhabism has 
been called the ‘single most arresting movement in the Islamic world’ during the early 
modern period.”87 According to Ozeren, Gunes, and Al-Badayneh, in the beginning, 
about 15 to 20 people in the gorge were Wahhabism followers. Soon the relationship 
between Wahhabists and Miurids88 became tense, especially after second war in 
Chechnya-Russia in 1999, when Chechen “boeviks” (armed groups) moved to Pankisi 
Gorge. Today there are about 200 Wahhabists in Pankisi Gorge.89 For example, in 
Pankisi’s largest village Duisi, there are two main mosques: one “traditional,” which is 
often visited by people of the older generation, and the other that worships Wahhabism 
and is more attractive to younger locals.90 Throughout the years, Pankisi Gorge has 
struggled with its image as the “lair for terrorists,” created in local and foreign, including 
Russian, media.  
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Juliette Ondet has studied three regions with Muslim minorities in Georgia and 
compared internal and external conditions of radicalization. Among internal conditions 
the author lists the economic situation, political disregard, and ethical and religious 
marginalization.91 There is no official data about the unemployment rate in Pankisi Gorge 
and how it compares to the rest of Georgia. Yet, researchers agree that lack of workplaces 
and conditions for self-realization contribute to young people leaving the region and 
going to fight as terrorists in Syria. Locals in Pankisi Gorge believe that families of those 
who fight in Syria live in better economic conditions.92 There are no exact numbers of 
how many fighters have left for Syria from Pankisi, but the issue received much attention 
in 2013–2014 when names of several fighters appeared on international terrorist lists.93 In 
2019, the thirty-third fighter from Pankisi died in the Syrian war.94 Estimates of Georgian 
fighters in Syria are between 100 and 200 and most of them are Kists.95  
Scholars also consider education as one of the factors making Pankisi Gorge a 
vulnerable region. The quality of education at schools is not high, and locals claim that 
many young boys do not want to continue studying in higher education institutions. 
According to Giorgi Kapanadze and Sergi Goguadze, “the lack of educational programs 
and activities allows for the spread of fundamentalist-radical ideas.”96 Kapanadze and 
Goguadze agree with those other scholars, saying that the state has not yet implemented a 
strategy for solving problems in Pankisi Gorge, including creation of workplaces, 
increasing civic engagement, and improving the educational system. Scholars believe that 
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the development of these systems will contribute to Pankisi’s de-radicalization, as well as 
its integration within the greater society of Georgia.   
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IV. RUSSIA’S USE OF HYBRID WARFARE IN GEORGIA AND 
PANKISI GORGE 
 RUSSIA’S HYBRID WARFARE IN GEORGIA 
Niklas Nilsson considers Georgia an interesting case study for Russia’s use of 
hybrid warfare. Since its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Georgia has often become a subject of Russia’s various tactics.97 These hybrid methods 
include the use of military forces, specifically gaining control over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia; cyber-attacks; disinformation and propaganda campaigns; manipulation through 
economic dependence; and the insertion of agents of influence in Georgian society and 
within the political elite. Nilsson argues that these tools “represent ‘pressure points that 
can potentially be activated or mobilized at a particular point in time, for example during 
an international crisis or ahead of elections, to undermine the Georgian government, to 
provoke domestic instability, or to exert influence on Georgian decision-makers in order 
to extract concessions.”98  
One particular tactic that Russia has actively used against Georgia throughout 
years is increasing military presence. Nilsson writes that the war in 2008 and the events 
before and after the conflict are perfect examples of hybrid warfare. First, before the 
conflict, Russia provided civilians of South Ossetia and Abkhaz with Russian passports 
to create an illusion that Russia was protecting its citizens with intervention. Second, 
Russia planned to wage a conflict in South Ossetia long before the war even started, and 
Moscow deployed over 20,000 troops soon after the conflict escalated to fight against 
Georgian armed forces.99 Third, Russia used cyber-attacks against the Georgian 
governmental websites and news media outlets. According to The New York Times, the 
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attacks limited the Georgian government’s ability to share its message and information, 
as well as connect with people around the world as the war progressed.100 And finally, to 
justify its actions, Russia started a disinformation campaign on an international level 
claiming that the Georgian side had killed 2,000 South Ossetian civilians. Russia and 
Georgia signed a Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement that ended the conflict in 2008. But 
soon after that, Russia started the process called “borderization” along the Administrative 
Boundary line with South Ossetia. According to Kornely Kakachia, “for Georgia, it 
specifically refers to the installation of border markers, fencing, and barbed wire along 
the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) that separate Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
from the rest of Georgia. In some cases, it involves the seizure of additional land. In all 
cases, it splits communities and causes unnecessary tensions.”101 Russian troops still 
remain in Georgia, specifically in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Russia continues to 
push a barbed wire border between Georgia and South Ossetia more and more towards 
the Georgian territorya process referred to as “creeping occupation.”102 The Russian 
military presence in Georgia can successfully be used in a renewed conflict between the 
two countries. Nilsson adds that Russia aims to keep a military threat credible and remind 
Georgia that the country should take every foreign policy decision while keeping in mind 
that there is a Russian army on Georgian lands.  
Apart from military activities, there are the diplomatic and economic tactics that 
Russia uses against Georgia to pressure the government and influence the decision-
making process. Nilsson supports this by discussing that the developments in Russia’s 
relationships with South Ossetia and Abkhazia have coincided with important events for 
Georgia’s relations with the West. For example, the election and referendum in South 
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Ossetia happened at the same time as the NATO-Georgia Public Diplomacy Forum in 
2017. It is typical for Russia to use diplomatic tools to put more pressure on Tbilisi.103 As 
Michael Lambert writes, “to this day, Georgia remains a diplomatic testing ground for the 
Kremlingiven the presence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”104  
As for the economic tools, because of high rates of unemployment and poverty, 
Georgia remains vulnerable to external economic manipulation. According to the 
National Statistics Office of Georgia, the unemployment rate in the country was about 
11.6% in 2019. According to Sergi Kapanadze, “Georgia has four central areas of 
economic vulnerability in relation to Russia: investments, trade, energy, and 
remittances.”105 For example, in 2019, 57% of Georgia’s wine exports came from Russia. 
The same year Russian tourists spent over $700 million in Georgia. In total, last year 
Georgia received $1.6 million from Russian tourists, money transfers, and the export of 
goods, which equals to over 9% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Nilsson 
argues that such dependence makes Georgia vulnerable to economic sanctions. For 
example, if Russia puts a ban on Georgian products, many local farmers would suffer 
from the consequences.106 According to Transparency International Georgia, however, 
the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has decreased Georgia’s economic dependence on 
Russia. For example, because of closed borders this year Georgia has received 32% fewer 
Russian tourists compared to 2019. The pandemic creates a chance to structurally change 
the entire economic system by making it less dependent on Russia and more focused on 
other countries, especially in the EU. 107  
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Kapanadze argues that Russia can also use other tactics, including the 
manipulation of the numerous Georgian citizens who work and live in Russia. For 
example, in 2006, the relationship between the two countries was tense. Russia put a ban 
on Georgian wine imports and started to expel Georgian citizens from the country. 
Consequently, two people died in the mass deportations.108 
 RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN GEORGIA 
 In recent years many local or foreign scholars and nonprofit organizations have 
studied Russia’s use of soft power in Georgia. Most of them agree that Russia uses 
propaganda and disinformation to influence media, political, and civic organizations, and 
alter public opinion in its favor. The actors that play the main role in spreading the 
Russian narrative are political parties, internet-based media, pro-Russian non-
governmental organizations (NGO), and factions in the Georgian Orthodox Church.109  
First, there are two political parties that keep close ties with Moscow: one is Nino 
Burjanadze’s Democratic Movement and the other, Irma Inashvili’s Alliance of Patriots. 
Burjanadze is a former chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia, rising to the position 
from 2001 to 2008. She joined the opposition to President Mikheil Saakashvili after he 
refused to include Soviet-style politicians in his political party.110 She met directly with  
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin several times, as well as with other high-ranking 
Russian officials such as then Prime Minister Medvedev. In 2018, Burjanadze appeared 
on Russia’s state TV channel and said that joining NATO would be “bad for Georgia”; 
instead, the priority should be a direct dialogue with Russia. She also mentioned that 
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Georgia wanted to form a friendly relationship with the United States in exchange for 
ruining connections with Russia, and doing so was a big mistake.111  
The Alliance of Patriots also openly opposes Georgia’s integration with the EU 
and NATO and considers it damaging to the country’s traditions. The party entered the 
Georgian parliament after the election in 2016, with 5% of votes. The party’s leaders 
often visit Moscow and meet with Russian governmental officials. In 2017, after a joint 
meeting in Russia’s capital, Inashvili proposed an innovative format called Georgia-
NATO-Russia. As Inashvili says, “NATO is a danger to Russia; [Russia] is always 
saying that Georgian territory might be used for an attack on them.”112 The leaders, 
including Inashvili herself, “talk up the Russian Orthodox Church’s links to Georgia”113 
and often use this connection to gain more followers.  
In addition, the Georgian Orthodox Church is considered a large player in 
Russia’s soft power activities. Markozashvili and Dvalishvili discuss that Russia 
implements its soft power tactics primarily in the societal and cultural spheres. The latter 
is developed around the church. Those who want Georgia to form a better relationship 
with Russia, instead of following a pro-Western direction, often identify the same 
religion as a main argument for closer alignment with Russia.114 Even though direct 
connections are difficult to prove, Georgian priests often repeat the Russian narrative, 
especially when it comes to minority rights. As Kapanadze writes, “The Georgian 
Orthodox Church has deeply entrenched beliefs and positions that are traditionally linked 
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with the Russian Orthodox Church and ill-matched with European values of tolerance, 
pluralism, and accountability.”115 
For example, in 2013 conservatives and members of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church attacked lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) activists who were 
demonstrating. The attack turned violent and the police had to transport the 
demonstrators in Tbilisi out of the city center in buses.116 In 2013 the Atlantic Journal 
wrote about Russia that “The Church's head, Patriarch Kirill, has been outspoken against 
‘social ills’ like alternative sexual orientations.”117 In 2017, the head of Russia’s 
Orthodox Church compared homosexuality to Nazism.118 While a year later, a priest in 
Georgia compared people attending the Gay Parade to having appearances like 
“Satan.”119  
According to Markozashvili and Dvalishvili, the other main sphere for Russia’s 
use of soft power is societal and includes organizations that either receive or are 
connected with Russian funds or Russian governmental officials. A 2015 research report 
by the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) identified the main 
pro-Russian players in the NGO sector and the media.120 The authors focused mainly on 
two institutions, both based in the capital Tbilisi: The Eurasian Institute (EI) and the 
Eurasian Choice (EC). The first one mostly organizes seminars and conferences, while 
the second organization is more focused on protest rallies. Their founders are also 
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involved with other NGOs that have similar activities. Many of them were founded after 
2013 and some have declared that they received funds from the Russian state budget. EI 
created an internet platform, Politforum, mainly to blame the Georgian government for 
the war in 2008. In 2013 EI started a project, “People’s Movement for the Russian 
Georgian Dialogue and Cooperation,” to find solutions to the conflict between the two 
countries. The organization also tries to create a negative narrative about European 
institutions.121 In 2013, Georgian historian Zaza Abashidze founded the Russian-
Georgian Public Center, which is a partner for the Gorchakov Fund for Public 
Diplomacy. This fund was established in 2010 and as Nilsson writes, “by a decree of 
President Medvedev for the explicit purpose of promoting Russia’s soft power in the 
post-Soviet space.”122  
According to a Caucasus Research Resource Center’s survey in 2017, over 47% 
of the people asked thought that Russian propaganda exists in Georgia.123 When it comes 
to Russian propaganda, media outlets play an important role in spreading disinformation. 
Media outlets Geworld.ge and saqinformi.ge often cover activities of the EC and EI and 
other organizations. Russia’s international media project Sputnik is also actively working 
in Georgia, even though it had to establish an online website after being banned from 
broadcasting in 2015. When it comes to media, Russia uses almost all channels of 
communication (TV, newspapers, internet, Russian officials and experts, representatives 
of Georgian civil society) to disseminate propaganda filled with false information and 
distorted facts in a purposeful, consistent, and continuous manner. This significantly 
increases its efficiency and undermines chances to fight it.124 
The following narratives can be identified in Russian propaganda:  
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1. Georgia is ruled by the West (important decisions are made in the U.S. 
Embassy to Georgia) and that impedes patriotic forces to come to power. 
The West uses Georgia in its geopolitical confrontation with Russia, 
which negatively impacts Georgia’s development.125  
2. The United States uses the Richard Lugar Centre for Public Health 
Research to carry out biological experiments on Georgia’s population;126  
3. The West is unable to defend Georgia when Russia is getting stronger. 
The war in Ukraine and the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 are given as 
examples, claiming that the United States helped Georgia only with “water 
and diapers.”127  
4. Georgia has no prospect of NATO membership and the country’s NATO 
aspirations harm Georgia’s interests. In addition, NATO membership is 
being portrayed as giving up the Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali regions. In 
accordance with the propaganda discourse, if Georgia abandons its NATO 
ambitions, it would be able to automatically restore territorial integrity.128  
5. The West funds NGOs in Georgia, which fight Georgia’s Orthodox 
Church, discredit patriotic forces and Georgian traditions, advocate sexual 
minorities, and seek to legalize same-sex marriage. Therefore, the West 
imposes non-traditional values on Georgia. Western values negatively 
affect traditional Georgian mores and lifestyle;129  
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6. As Markozashvili and Dvalishvili write, “The discourse regarding 
political/economic relevance of Russia is enriched with the constant 
reminders regarding the shared Orthodox Christian values.”130  
7. One of the central priorities of the Russian information narrative is to 
cultivate anti-Turkish sentiments in Georgia. Turkey is portrayed as 
occupying Georgia’s ancestral lands, and carries out aggressive economic 
expansion. In accordance with the narrative, the Turkish threat will further 
rise in the case of Georgia’s integration to NATO.131 
Additionally, IDFI names the following risks if the government does not 
implement activities against Kremlin propaganda: 1) The population’s support of 
Georgia’s European integration might ease and the number of those who support 
Georgia’s close ties with Russia might increase; 2) Propaganda allows an outside power 
to influence the country’s political agenda and threaten its sovereignty; 3) Xenophobia, 
ethnic, and religious conflicts might increase and the societal unity might be 
weakened.132 Kapanadze writes that the cumulative use of soft power can affect political 
stability and economic vulnerability in Georgia, as well as slow its integration with EU 
and NATO.133  
While Russia’s use of hybrid warfare is thoroughly studied in Georgia and in its 
capital Tbilisi, little is known about the methods and tactics used in Pankisi Gorge.   
 THE OVERVIEW OF RUSSIA’S INFORMATION WARFARE IN 
PANKISI GORGE 
According to James K. Wither, one of the most successful methods that Russia 
used against Ukraine in 2014 was information warfare. As he writes, “Broader media 
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exploitation techniques blurred the lines between truth and falsehood, creating an 
alternative reality for those observers who accepted the Russian media’s view of 
events.”134 Lionel Beehner also writes that information warfare is one of Russia’s 
methods to take advantage of and control the narrative in a target region. It mainly 
depends on the psychological aspect of information that helps to shape individual and 
collective ideas. In other words, using such methods creates and alters public opinion.135 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Russia decided to use information warfare against 
Georgia as well.  
News media, both Russian and Georgian, play the primary role in spreading 
disinformation and shaping public opinion, and Russia’s information campaign is focused 
on portraying Pankisi Gorge as a closed society that functions as a shelter and transit 
place for terrorists. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, has stated 
multiple times that the Islamic State has training camps in Pankisi Gorge, and it can be 
considered as national threat for Russia. His statements have been widely covered by 
Russian media throughout years. In addition, the false narrative about the Pankisi Gorge 
as a closed, isolated region is often published on Russian websites to strengthen the 
stereotype.  
Russia also uses different methods of propaganda in Pankisi Gorge. Supporters of 
the head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov use different tools to spread 
propaganda. As an example, a June 15, 2018 episode can be cited, during the Ramadan 
Bayram period. A provocation was organized by the supporters of Ramzan Kadyrov in 
the village of Duisi in Pankisi Gorge. At the time, those in a car, which had Russian 
Federation plate numbers, affixed a photo of former Chechnya President Ahmed-Khaji 
Kadyrov on the car. The chanting of shouts of "Ahmed is power" were heard. The 
incident caused dissatisfaction within the Salafi community of the valley, and their 
demand for removal of the picture from the car resulted in verbal and physical 
confrontation. Many people living in Pankisi are refugees from the Russian-Chechnyan 
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war, people who lost their homeland because of this conflict, and therefore, they would 
put up with Russian provocation. The conflict was resolved after law enforcement 
intervened. It may be assumed that this provocation served to check what kind of attitude 
the Pankisi Gorge population had towards the Kadyrov regime and how stable the 
situation was there. 136  
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V. ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION ABOUT 
PANKISI GORGE 
 METHODOLOGY 
To reveal Russia’s use of disinformation in Pankisi Gorge, 15 Russian media 
outlets and 101 stories from online and broadcast media were analyzed. I chose media 
outlets based on the BBC’s list of Russian press profiles and focused on the ones that are 
government owned or pro-Kremlin.137 But to have a variety of results, I also analyzed 
those media outlets considered more or less independent. The focus was more on online 
and broadcast media, because according to the Caucasus Barometer, those are two of the 
main sources of information for the Georgian public.138 I conducted a keyword search of 
the word “Pankisi” in Russian on the websites and analyzed the content that came up as a 
result. Not included were those media publications that had no content about Pankisi. 
As for the term disinformation, I used the following definition: purposeful spread 
of false information that is intended to mislead the public.139 It does not always consist of 
false facts; instead, it can be true information put together in a way to change the context 
and create a wrong impression. Experts usually agree that disinformation is mostly 
purposeful and it can be a part of a bigger agenda.140 
To prove that the stories marked as disinformation were, in fact, false, I made 
comparisons with how Georgian and international media covered the same issue, as well 
as what the official statements of the Georgian government were.  
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The content analysis allowed us to identify sources and narratives in two types of 
Russian media outlets that are the most accessible to the Georgian population. The 
content analysis is divided in two parts: qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative 
section includes the number and type of stories that contain at least one piece of 
disinformation, as well as which media outlet published the highest number of such 
stories. The qualitative section deals with themes and narratives most common in Russian 
stories about Pankisi Gorge that contain disinformation, and the section identifies the 
authors of those narratives. 
 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Through the targeted keyword search, I identified and analyzed 101 news stories 
in online and broadcast media. Out of those, the majority, 89 stories, were published in 
the form of online news, articles, or interviews, while 12 were published as broadcast 
stories. The analysis showed that out of 101 stories, 54 contained at least one piece of 
disinformation about Pankisi Gorge. And 47 stories did not have false information about 
the region or the events that took place there. As for the type of media, 11 out of 12 
broadcast stories spread disinformation, while about half of the online content had false 
information or distorted facts. 
Twelve stories (about 22%) with disinformation were published on 
Kavkazoved.info. The media outlet was founded by Russia in Abkhaziathe 
northwestern region in Georgia that the country has declared occupied by Russia.141 The 
organization’s aim is to study Caucasus and its border regions and publish analytical 
articles. The website says that it promotes the unity of people living in Russia and in 
Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries. According to the “About us” 
section “the information presented on the site will be interesting and useful not only for 
scientists specializing in the study of the Caucasus, but also for everyone who is 
interested in this topic.”142 Alexander Borisovich Krylov is the president of Kavkazoved. 
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He has been very much interested in Georgian-Abkhazian relations and has written a 
couple of articles on the topic. In one of his articles he says that it is part of Georgian 
propaganda to blame Russia for escalating military conflict in Abkhazia.143 He also says 
that Russia and the United States do not have similar policies in the South Caucasus and 
that may become a serious issue in the future. As he writes “the geographical proximity 
of the South Caucasus to Iraq and the Middle East increases the likelihood that the region 
will turn into another target and zone of activity for radical Islamic and international 
terrorist organizations.”144 Kavkazoved seems to repeat its president’s ideology regarding 
Georgia becoming a hot spot of terrorists planning attacks in the region. Kavkazoved has 
published several stories spreading disinformation about Pankisi Gorge, specifically that 
this region conveys a terrorism threat.  
The next media outlet with the highest number of stories that contain 
disinformation was Topwar.ru (Voennoye Obozreniye). The online publication was 
founded in 2012 and has been publishing stories and analytical articles about military 
affairs, military conflicts, geopolitics, and weapons.145 (See Figure 3.)  
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Figure 3.  Disinformation by media outlet 
Topwar.ru was followed by Channel One and Rossiyskaya Gazeta that published 
five and six stories, respectively, containing disinformation. Channel One is controlled by 
the Russian government. The Russian state owns 51% of the TV station and private 
shareholders own 49%.146 And it reaches millions of viewers every day. Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta is also a government publication and one of the largest newspapers in Russia.147  
The next media outlet would be Mir 24. All seven broadcast news stories that 
came up through the keyword search contain disinformation. Mir 24 is part of a 
broadcasting company “Mir” that operates from post-soviet countries, including Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova since 1992. It was 
founded by the CIS, an international organization that aims to regulate relations among 
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post-soviet countries.148 Georgia ended its membership in 2008. As for Mir 24, it has 
been on the air since 2013 and has a potential audience of 62 million people.149  
As for the Moscow Times, which is considered more or less independent 
compared to other media outlets, only five out of 17 stories had disinformation. This 
means that the majority of content spread truthful information about Pankisi Gorge. The 
Moscow Times is an online only English newspaper based in Moscow since 1992. It is the 
main publication of the Independent Media Sanoma Magazines and covers current affairs 
in Russia and beyond.150 
 QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
The analysis showed that themes of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation 
campaign in Pankisi Gorge are different from the rest of the country. Throughout 
Georgia, Russia focuses on common religion and history and anti-Western ideology. 
While when it comes to Pankisi Gorge, Russia tries to create the image of a lawless, 
extremist region where terrorists are trained and where the Georgian government has no 
power. The disinformation campaign is focused on portraying the locals as terrorists, 
strengthening the stereotypes, causing frustration among the residents of the valley, and 
creating destabilization. To achieve the goal, Russia actively uses the fact that youth from 
Pankisi Gorge have gone to fight with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While 
such cases have happened, the number is not on the rise. The analysis shows that Russian 
media outlets falsify facts, use exaggerated data, and even mistranslate interviews to 
present Pankisi Gorge as a shelter and transit place for terrorists. In such stories, authors 
or sources often say that Pankisi Gorge poses a threat not only for Georgia, but for Russia 
and the entire region as well, to show that the two countries have to deal with the danger 
by cooperating with each other.  
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There were four main narratives that the majority of stories spread. One is that 
terrorists have always been hiding in Pankisi Gorge and that there are training camps in 
the valley. Another is that Pankisi Gorge is an isolated, closed region where people do 
not speak Georgian and it is dangerous to walk without a local guide. The third narrative 
is that the valley poses a threat for Russia as well, because terrorists residing there can 
cross the border and attempt attacks on Russian territory. And lastly, there is the narrative 
that the EU, the United States, or Georgia’s neighboring countries such as Turkey will 
not take action if the situation in Pankisi Gorge deteriorates. Georgia could only hope for 
Russia’s help and cooperation in the fight against terrorism.  
As the diagram in Figure 4 shows, out of the 101 stories analyzed about Pankisi 
Gorge, 96 covered the issue of terrorism.  
 
Figure 4. Distribution of stories based on four main narratives 
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1. Terrorists Are Hiding in Pankisi Gorge 
Pankisi Gorge has struggled with a damaged reputation for years, mainly because 
of the events in 2001−2002 when Chechen militants were hiding in the valley. Back then 
the United States took action and helped Georgia to avoid Russia’s intervention. The 
conflict was resolved, and the Georgian government got back control over this region, but 
stories about terrorists and training camps have not gone away since then. Events that 
happened in Pankisi Gorge in the beginning of the 2000s have become a baseline of 
Russia’s disinformation campaign. Back then Russia blamed Georgia for allowing 
Chechen terrorists to reside in Pankisi Gorge and not taking action to regain control over 
the region. As the Russian parliament wrote in an official statement, “the expansion of 
terrorist activity in Georgia was facilitated by the position of the Georgian leadership, 
which had long denied the existence of international terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge and 
refused to cooperate with Russia in order to prevent the threat of terrorism.”151 
The aftermath of these events turned out to be Russia’s information warfare 
against Pankisi Gorge and the main tactic is to manufacture reality through mass media 
content. As Alina Polyakova and Spencer P. Boyer write, the aim of such a method is to 
“muddle the notion of truth or objectivity, blur the line between fact and falsehood, and 
sow confusion among publics.”152 
In 2003, Channel One, Russian government-controlled television, which has over 
250 million viewers, said that Algerians arrested in Britain for making a deadly poison 
Ricin were trained in Pankisi Gorge.153 Sergey Ivanov, Russia’s then Defense Minister, 
made a statement about it at a conference in Munich where Georgia also participated. He 
claimed Ricin was prepared in home-made laboratories in Pankisi Gorge. In response, the 
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Georgian government said there was no evidence that such laboratories ever existed in 
the valley. As then president Shevardnadze said, “my kind advice would be to Ivanov and 
to Russia to take care of Chechnya and solve problems there. Georgia will take care of 
Pankisi.”154  
Interestingly, Channel One only published content about Pankisi Gorge in 2002 
and 2003, right after the conflict that involved Chechen militants, which was discussed in 
introduction. No recent stories about Pankisi Gorge were found on the website of 
Channel One. But in the years to come Russia, through various media outlets, tried to 
strengthen the stereotype that the situation has never changed in Pankisi Gorge, and it has 
continued to be a dangerous region where terrorists would be trained and sheltered. One 
of the most common ways to spread such a narrative is for Russian government officials 
or agencies to make a certain claim, which is then widely covered in media, with or 
without comments from the Georgian side.  
In 2008 Lenta.ru published a statement of Anatoly Zabrodin, first deputy head of 
the border guard department of the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the 
Russian Federation, saying that terrorists living in Pankisi Gorge might attempt to enter 
Russia. He also mentioned that terrorists had not successfully done yet, but there were 
multiple attempts in previous years.155 The story had a headline saying: “FSB warned of 
threat of breakthrough of militants from Georgia,” which creates an impression that the 
FSB had verified information, not just the claims of one of its officials. Similar 
allegations were made a year later by Alexander Bortnikov, the head of the FSB, who 
blamed the Georgian government for the destabilizing situation in Northern Caucasus and 
said that Al Qaeda terrorists were moving from Georgia to Chechnya. Yet, those claims 
have never been confirmed by the Georgian side. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
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Georgia answered that there were no terrorists in Pankisi Gorge.156 The head of the 
Georgian Parliament, Davit Bakradze, said that Russia was manipulating the same issue 
that it did over 10 years ago when there was a crisis in Pankisi.  
Allegations continued in the following years. In January 2016, Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov said that based on Russian intelligence the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) was operating a training camp in Pankisi Gorge: “ISIL militants are 
using this hardly accessible territory to train, rest and replenish their supplies.”157 He 
suggested renewing diplomatic relations that have been suspended between the two 
countries because of the war in August 2008. The Georgian government denied the 
allegations and said that Pankisi Gorge was under control and there was no threat of 
terrorism. Lavrov’s statement was spread by different Russian websites. Kavkazoved.info 
published an interview with political analyst and chief editor of the New Baku Post, Tofig 
Abbasov, who claimed that it is highly possible that there is ISIS military base in Pankisi.  
Another story on Kavkazoved from 2016 claimed that a big group of terrorists 
from ISIS would attack from Georgia.158 The story was based on an interview with 
military analyst Vakhtang Maisaia, published in the Georgian newspaper Rezonans. 
Kavkazoved said that according to the story on Rezonans, the group included 600 to 700 
people. However, there is no such information in the Georgian version of the story.159 
Maisaia, who is a source for both articles, was arrested in 2009 and charged with spying 
for foreign special services. The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs said that Maisaia 
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used to send secret information about Georgia’s military, armaments, and politics and 
economy to sources outside the country.160 
In 2016, topwar.ru published a story with the title “Pankisi Gorge: A Problem for 
Russia or Georgia.” The story continued a narrative about a militant base in Pankisi 
Gorge and cited Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. 161 Another story about 
Lavrov’s statements also said that Russia was forced to refuse a visa-free regime with 
Georgia because “[the] terrorism threat has not disappeared from Pankisi.”162 
Georgian governmental officials quickly responded to Lavrov’s allegations, 
assuring the local community and international society that a militant base or a training 
camp for terrorists does not exist in Pankisi Gorge. The same statement was made by then 
U.S. Ambassador in Georgia, Ian C. Kelly, who visited Pankisi and said that Georgia and 
the United States fought together against terrorism.163  
Sometimes, if such a statement comes from a high official, it is interpreted as 
truth by the general public. For example, in the comments section on one of the stories 
published on Topwar.ru, the viewer wrote the following: “Because the statement was 
made by Lavrov, there should be something in this valley.”164 And comments turned into 
a discussion about if the Russian government had occupied the Georgian capital Tbilisi 
back in August 2008 this problem would not exist now. 
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As for the locals leaving to fight in Syria, in 2017 Goguadze wrote that there is no 
exact data about how many Pankisi locals have gone to fight with ISIS, but the number is 
somewhere between 100 and 200.165 Some scholars, such as terrorism expert Mamuka 
Areshidze, say the number is declining partially because of reported deaths of Georgian 
fighters, lack of charismatic leaders, and an internal split in the Kist community.166  
The narrative about Pankisi Gorge being a nest of terrorism creates a lot of 
frustration among locals and makes them feel marginalized. Such a narrative does not 
come just from Russian media, however, but from pro-opposition Georgian press as well, 
which sometimes exaggerates and dramatizes facts about the valley. Sulkhan 
Bordzikashvili started to analyze media stories about Pankisi Gorge over ten years ago 
and discovered that many of them spread disinformation about his region. As he said in 
an interview in 2020 with Publika.ge, “I was thinking why there is no one from our 
community to tell the truth about what’s happening here and inform the society.”167 In an 
interview with Netgazeti.ge, another young Pankisi local, Islam Gorgishvili, said that he 
often has to prove to people living in other regions that the valley does not pose any 
threat, that there are no terrorism camps or free trade of weapons. As he said, “Such an 
attitude towards us, makes us feel that we are not citizens of this country, that we are 
“others.”168  The locals, especially young people, have been trying to overcome the 
stereotype through opening hotels, developing tourism, and attracting more visitors to the 
valley.169 
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2. Isolated Region and Closed Community 
A couple of stories published in Russian media followed the narrative that Pankisi 
Gorge is an isolated, closed community where people do not speak Georgian and where 
others should not go without a local guide. Such a narrative contributes to creating the 
image of Pankisi as a separate and marginalized region of Georgia, creating more 
frustration among the locals who have been trying to overcome the stereotypes for years.  
In 2016, a state-owned TV channel Russia 24 published a 17-minute special video 
report about Pankisi Gorge with the following headline: “The Pankisi Syndrome.” This 
news story is a perfect example of mixing disinformation with truth. In the beginning of 
the video, the author says that Pankisi has become a peaceful region where people do not 
move around with weapons anymore. But later in the story the journalist says that there is 
not a single hotel or restaurant in the valley. One of the most popular hotels “Nazy’s 
Guesthouse” was renovated in 2012−2013 and already existed when Russia 24 made the 
story in 2016.170 Another piece of disinformation is the following sentence in the author’s 
introductory text: “The same way as 100 years ago, they quickly detect non-locals. It’s 
better not to move around without a local guide.”171 In recent years there have not been 
any stories in Georgian media about people having problems in Pankisi Gorge because 
they were foreigners or from other cities. In fact, tourism is one of the fields that locals 
actively work at to develop and attract more visitors to the region.  
Another media outlet that has been spreading the same narrative about Pankisi 
Gorge is Mir 24. A broadcast story published in May 2017 claims that people in Pankisi 
live in isolation, according to their own laws that are dictated by fundamentalist 
leaders.172 Most of the comments under the video, say that the information is false, and 
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the journalist lies.173 Pankisi Gorge is part of Georgia and the same laws apply there as in 
the rest of the country. The authors did not translate the beginning of the interview with a 
young local who said in Georgian that the cases of people going to fight in Syria are not 
that many. It is difficult to hear the Georgian version if you are not closely listening. Such 
manipulation is one of the techniques used in disinformation campaigns by Russia, and it 
is often referred to as “distortion.”174 In other words, it includes misreporting the facts in 
a way to fit the chosen narrative. For example, in 2017 seven Russian media outlets 
mistranslated a quote from U.S. Lt. Col. Steve Gventer and created the impression that 
NATO had an aggressive plan towards Russia.175 In cases like this there are two 
scenarios: it was either an innocent mistake or a deliberate one. Nevertheless, the analysis 
revealed that it is, in fact, a pattern for Mir 24 when it comes to covering events in 
Pankisi Gorge. 
Another story from 2017 published by Mir 24 had the following headline: “How 
Pankisi Turned into a Factory of Militants.” Similar to the other one, this story spreads 
disinformation that hardly anyone in Pankisi speaks Georgian.176 Yet, a Georgian survey 
conducted in 2019 found that among other minorities living in the country, Kists have the 
highest rate of knowledge of the Georgian language.177 In a nine-minute video story 
published in 2017 as well, the author narrates in Russian that Pankisi Gorge is a lawless, 
closed region where fundamentalists dictate the laws. While listening to this, the viewer 
sees video footage of tanks and militants from the beginning of the 2000s. Nothing in the 
video or in the text indicates that this is archival footage, creating an impression that it is 
                                                 
173 Robakidze, “Панкисси: территория беспредела или гнездо террористов” [Pankisi: Territory of 
Lawlessness or Nest of Terrorists].  
174 “Misleading by Mistranslation: How a Cluster of Russian Sites Ran a Fake Story Based on a False 
Translation,” Medium, June 28, 2017, https://medium.com/dfrlab/misleading-by-mistranslation-
38f4bb342aa. 
175 Medium, “Misleading by Mistranslation.” 
176 Mikhail Robakidze, “Как Панкиси превратилось в фабрику боевиков” [How Pankisi Became a 
Militant Factory], Mir 24, December 3, 2017, https://mir24.tv/news/15824206/kak-pankisi-prevratilos-v-
fabriku-boevikov. 
177 Tea Topuria, “კვლევის შედეგები: საქართველოს თავიანთ სამშობლოდ ყველაზე მეტად 
ოსები და ქისტები მიიჩნევენ” [Survey Results: Most Ossetians and Kists Consider Georgia Their 
Homeland], Radio Free Europe, May 17, 2019, https://rb.gy/953uad.  
52 
the current situation in Pankisi Gorge. The author continues the narrative by saying that 
“nobody in the region wants to get [an] education,” followed by another example of 
mistranslation. One can clearly hear in Georgian that the respondent is saying “I want to 
apply to study in the conservatory if possible, let’s see how it goes,” while the Russian 
translation says: “We want to have more musical schools in the region, so that youth 
would not have to live in isolation.” Mistranslation clearly serves to strengthen the 
stereotype about Pankisi being the isolated, closed community, while in reality the 
respondent talks about her personal dreams.  
Most of the stories about Pankisi for Mir 24 are produced by one correspondent, 
Mikhail Robakidze, a journalist who previously worked for the Georgian Public 
Broadcaster. In all his stories Robakidze used the same words such as “nest of terrorism,” 
“factory of militants,” “grey spot on Georgia’s map,” “lawless region.” and “closed 
community.” As a result, he repeats the same falsified narrative in every story.  
Other media outlets continued a similar narrative in the following years. A more 
recent story from May 2019 published on Lenta.ru had the following headline for the 
news about Chechens’ protest against the dam being built in Pankisi: “Pankisi Invasion: 
This Georgian gorge is called the ‘home of terrorists.’ Here according to their laws, 
Chechens live.”178 The headline spreads false information, as Pankisi is not known as the 
“home of terrorists.” Later in the narrative, the author also wrongfully claims that Pankisi 
Gorge is a closed community where strangers are not welcome and most people do not 
speak Georgian.179 The phrases used are very similar to the words spread by Mir 24 and 
Russia 24, such as “closed nature of the local community,” “strangers are not always 
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welcome here,” and “most of the local Kists do not even speak Georgian.”180 None of 
these claims are true. In 2018, the Public Defender of Georgia, Nino Lomjaria, said that 
according to locals the situation in Pankisi Gorge has been peaceful for years.181 A local 
media outlet from Pankisi writes that people talk with each other in the Chechen 
language, but they are fluent in Georgian as well.182  
3. Threat to Russia 
In its disinformation campaign, Russia often mentions that Pankisi Gorge is not 
just Georgia’s problem and that the valley poses a threat to Russia and the entire 
surrounding region as well. This narrative serves to create an impression in international 
as well as local societies that Russia is in danger from terrorists operating in Pankisi 
Gorge because they can cross the border and organize terrorist attacks in Russia. 
Therefore, if Russia decides to violate Pankisi’s territorial integrity, there is a chance the 
government would try to justify the intervention through the high risk of terrorist attacks 
that would otherwise harm Russia.  
In 2012 Topwar.ru published an interview with the former special envoy of the 
Chechen separatists in Georgia, Khizri Aldamov. He spoke about possible anti-Russian 
projects that Georgia’s then president, Mikheil Saakashvili, was preparing. One was to 
create “the government of Ichkeria in exile” with the support of the United States and the 
second, to continue the activities of the Jamaat terrorist group from Pankisi Gorge. As 
Aldamov said, “in general, the problem is that the whole of Georgia since the collapse of 
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the Soviet Union is an anti-Russian terrorist nest.”183 Even though this is only Aldamov’s 
opinion, there is nothing in the story that indicates that these ideas have not been verified. 
Another story from Topwar.ru has the following headline: “A Problem for Russia 
or Georgia.” The headline itself suggests that Pankisi Gorge can pose a threat to Russia. 
The analytical article was also published after Lavrov’s allegations and discusses the 
possibility of a terrorist camp in Pankisi Gorge. The author claims that South Ossetian 
officials are worried that terrorists would easily cross the border and organize attacks in 
their region. As the author says, “by Georgian standards, the border is securely guarded. 
This means that everyone will pass.”184  
In 2016 Kavkazoved published a story about Lavrov’s allegations together with 
an interview with Alexander Krylov, president of Kavkazoved. Krylov claimed that the 
possible existence of a military training camp in Pankisi Gorge was very high, creating an 
alarming situation for Georgia. Krylov even went further and said that South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia can face a threat as well. He writes that “given the danger of a growing 
guerrilla war, perhaps our military will need some kind of adjustment of actions, not only 
in South Ossetia, but also in Armenia and Abkhazia.”185 
In 2017 Interfax.ru published a story with the headline: “Georgia Refuses to 
Discuss Accommodation of Migrants from Europe.” The story said that Austrian Foreign 
Minister Sebastian Kurz suggested relocating migrants living in some European countries 
to Georgia and creation of refugee camps.186 Franz Klintsevich, the first deputy head of 
the Federation Council defense and security committee of Russia said that this would 
affect Russia’s national security. As he said, “we remember the time when terrorists 
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trained in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge and then operated in our Caucasus."187 The headline 
indicates that Georgia was against such discussion; however, the Georgian government 
and Austrian officials said that these discussions never even took place.188  
4. Only Russia Can Save Georgia 
In January 2016, Kavkazoved.info published a story about the threat of terrorism 
in Pankisi Gorge, citing Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who said that ISIS uses 
Pankisi for training, recreation, and replenishment of terrorists. The story also cites 
Giorgi Kvirikashvili, then Georgia’s Prime Minister, who explained that there was no 
threat of terrorism from Pankisi Gorge. Later in the narrative the author claimed that the 
situation in Pankisi Gorge was not under the control of the Georgian government, leading 
to the conclusion that there is a need for cooperation between the two countries. The 
author Mikhail Agajanyan has claimed that “Georgia could count on Russia’s help in 
neutralizing terrorist threats;"189 but, since 2008 diplomatic relations between these two 
countries have not been renewed. Agajanyan has often written about Georgia and its 
relations with other countries in the region and beyond. For example, in 2016 Agajanyan 
wrote that the United States was trying to get involved in Georgia’s parliamentary 
elections and “weaken coalition powers of ‘Georgian Dream’ (current ruling party)."190   
In the story about Pankisi Gorge, Agajanyan tries to create a false impression not 
only about Pankisi Gorge, but generally about Georgia. First, the claim that ISIS used 
Pankisi Gorge as a location for training and vacation is false and has never been verified 
                                                 
187 “Georgia Refuses to Discuss Accommodation of Migrants from Europe,” Interfax, March 5, 2017, 
https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/28899/. 
188 Nana Sajaia, “Russian Media Tries to Link Georgia’s EU Visa Waiver to Refugee Camps,” Voice 
of America, March 7, 2017, https://www.voanews.com/europe/russian-media-tries-link-georgias-eu-visa-
waiver-refugee-camps. 
189 Mikhail Agajanian, “Исчезла ли террористическая угроза из Панкисского ущелья?” [Has the 
terrorist threat disappeared from the Pankisi Gorge?], Фонд стратегической культуры [Strategic Culture 
Foundation], January 29, 2016, https://www.fondsk.ru/news/2016/01/29/ischezla-li-terroristicheskaja-
ugroza-iz-pankisskogo-uschela-38290.html. 
190 Mikhail Agajanian, “США ускоряют процесс вовлечения Грузии в НАТО” [US accelerates 
Georgia’s NATO membership process], Фонд стратегической культуры [Strategic Culture Foundation], 
February 2, 2014, https://www.fondsk.ru/news/2014/02/11/usa-uskorjajut-process-vovlechenia-gruzii-v-
nato-25673.html. 
56 
by the Georgian government or the U.S. State Department. Although young locals from 
the region have gone to fight with ISIS, it does not mean that the region itself is a “nest 
for terrorism.” Second, by saying that Turkey has a weak antiterrorism policy, the author 
creates a narrative that only Russia would help Georgia to neutralize a terrorism threat. 
He presents Russia as a savior in times of need and the only hope for the Georgian 
government to fight terrorism.  
An earlier story, published by Kavkazoved.info in 2015, discussed the history of 
Pankisi Gorge and why it attracted so much attention in recent years. The author blames 
Georgia’s ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili for problems not only in Pankisi Gorge, but 
on the Georgian-Russian border as well.191 Similar to other stories, this one also 
promotes more cooperation between Russia and Georgia when it comes to neutralizing 
terrorism threats. The author writes that the two countries have the same interests in 
fighting Jihadism. The author also cites the head of the Caucasian Center for Strategic 
Research, Mamuka Areshidze, who has said that all Georgian governments make the 
same mistake: not paying enough attention to Pankisi Gorge. Nevertheless, if we look at 
the same quote in Georgian media, it is clear that Areshidze meant the socio-economic 
conditions and that none of the governments have cared to create more work 
opportunities in Pankisi. By contrast, the context is not mentioned in the story on 
Kavkazoved.info, and therefore, it creates the impression that Pankisi needs more 
attention because of a terrorism threat. Areshidze himself, however, is one of those 
people who has claimed multiple times that Russia is using Pankisi Gorge for 
manipulation on the international level. For example, in an interview with GHN, the 
Georgian News Agency, in 2009, Areshidze said that in the beginning of this century 
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Russia created an image of Georgia as a place where terrorists were hiding and the 
country spends a lot of time and energy to get rid of that name.192  
Another story published on Topwar.ru claimed that there is no evidence that 
Europe would help Georgia combat the terrorism threat coming from Pankisi Gorge. 
Therefore, Georgian experts and politicians were thinking about cooperation with 
Moscow on this issue.193 Yet, no such news has been published in Georgian media, and 
no official statements were made by the government about fighting terrorism with Russia. 
This is, in fact, a common narrative for Russia. Media Development Foundation 
in Georgia analyzed the coverage of Muslims on Russian TV and online media. They 
found that Russian media was trying to strengthen the idea that the only safe place, where 
ISIS is prohibited and where the government can effectively fight against terrorism, is 
Russia.194 And when it comes to Pankisi Gorge, Russia tries to strengthen this narrative 
to underline the importance of cooperation and united efforts between the two countries.  
Alexander Dugin is a Russian political analyst and Putin supporter known for his 
nationalist views. He wants to create a Eurasian Union where Russia would be a leading 
nation in a union that would include former Soviet countries.195 In 2004 he wrote for a 
Russian newspaper a story with the headline “Georgian Scenarios.” One such scenario he 
discussed was a nationalist one in which “Moscow actualizes through its influence all 
the lines of disintegrationterritorial, ethnic and political, contributes to the 
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dismemberment of Georgia and a long-term depression of the entire region, by directly 
annexing South Ossetia, Abkhazia, possibly Adjara to Russia, and other parts of 
Georgia, striking at Pankisi and mobilizing those marginal political forces that 
continue to adhere to a pro-Russian orientation.”196 Back in 2004, Dugin hinted that 
Pankisi could be used by Russia. And for years to follow, Georgian experts would 
discuss how could Russia destabilize Pankisi and justify its intervention in the country 
by a terrorism threat. 
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VI. HOW RUSSIA CAN USE INSTABILITY IN PANKISI FOR 
INTERVENTION IN GEORGIA 
The evidence strongly suggests that Russia is highly interested in Pankisi Gorge 
and is actively using disinformation and propaganda to spread a false narrative about the 
region. Through information warfare, Russia tries to strengthen the stereotype about 
Pankisi Gorge as a dangerous, lawless region that can threaten not only Georgia, but the 
entire Caucasus region. The question is why might Russia be interested in destabilizing 
the valley and what possible scenarios can develop in the region afterwards? The issue of 
how Russia can use destabilization in Pankisi Gorge in its favor has not been widely 
studied by Georgian or foreign scholars. Nevertheless, some literature and interviews 
with different experts such as Aladashvili, Areshidze, and Natadze published in Georgian 
media during the last two decades show that the issue needs more attention.197 To 
understand how Russia might be destabilizing the situation in Pankisi Gorge to its own 
advantage, we should first understand past examples of justifying intervention through 
the threat of terrorism. 
Russia used hybrid warfare in the military conflict both in Crimea and in South 
Ossetia. The information warfare tactics are similar in both conflicts as well. Russia tried 
to create an impression that extremists were residing in Crimea to justify its actions with 
the argument of protecting the country from terrorists. In fact, Pavel Baev writes that 
“one of the justifications advanced by Moscow for its deployment of special operations 
forces in Crimea was the allegedly urgent task of preventing terrorist attacks on the 
Russia population.”198 Russia launched an anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign, focused 
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on fighting extremism and terrorism. The information warfare altered the community 
view so much so that in 2018, only couple of years after the dispute, 56% of Russians had 
a pessimistic outlook about Ukraine. Even more disturbingly, 9% of Russians believed 
the organizers of the 2017 attack were Ukrainians.199   
Russia continued its narrative of terrorists residing in Crimea and would assign 
responsibility for terrorist activities to Crimean Muslims.200 Further, freelance journalists 
were charged with involvement in terrorism because of their reporting in Crimea.201  
In 2017 Russia intervened in Syria and deployed its troops permanently. But the 
Russia had cited a terrorist threat long before the intervention to justify its military 
operations. As the U.S. Department of State acknowledged in 2017, “Russian military 
intervention in Syria factored heavily in public counterterrorism messaging.” 202 The 
Atlantic Council writes that although Russia’s aim was to protect its ally, the Syrian state, 
in fact, only a small proportion of the air strikes targeted ISIS.203 
Georgian scholars have not analyzed Russia’s disinformation campaign in Pankisi 
Gorge and its possible future implications. But local and foreign experts have been 
talking about the threats of expansion of military activities and intervention scenarios for 
years. In 2018 Kenneth Spencer Yalowitz, a former U.S. ambassador to Georgia who 
served there in the beginning of the 2000s, gave an interview to the Voice of America. He 
said Pankisi Gorge concerns not only Georgia’s internal security, but external security as 
well. As he explains, “Russia can bring forward the issue of Pankisi Gorge and easily 
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create more tension in its relationship with Georgia.”204 Others think that information 
warfare might lead to more severe consequences.  
Georgian experts such as Aladashvili, Khuhashvili, and Areshidze think that 
destabilization in Pankisi Gorge can also be useful for Russia to justify its military 
intervention on Georgian territory. Irakli Aladashvili, the editor in chief of a military 
magazine Arsenali wrote back in 2009 that Pankisi Gorge is a constant target for Russia. 
The author draws a possible scenario for provocation: Russia sends small armed groups 
of special forces into the valley who get involved in different activities. Those activities 
are then covered by Russian and even Georgian media. As a result, Russia can announce 
the need for targeted antiterrorist operations in Pankisi Gorge.205 
The same year another expert, Nodar Natadze, said there was a chance for 
Russia’s military operation in Pankisi Gorge. As Natadze said, “Russia has everything 
ready: army standing at the border, roads going to the Caucasian pass and PR campaign 
on goingsaying that Al Qaeda is operating in Georgia.”206 According to Natadze, 
Russia could use the argument of neutralizing the threat coming from Pankisi Gorge to 
intervene on Georgian territory.  
In 2009, when the director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) 
Alexander Bortnikov made allegations that terrorists were moving from Georgia to the 
Northern Caucasus, the expert Mamuka Areshidze said that this statement had a message 
for the future. As he told Radio Free Liberty:  
All the crossings and passes on the perimeter of the entire Caucasus are 
occupied by the Russianseven those that used to be either jointly 
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controlled or completely out of control. Now they control all of these 
passes, they are moved to the territory of Georgia as much as possible. 
Based on their laws,207 if the situation becomes more complex, it is 
possible that they will take an aggressive approach.208  
In 2016, after Lavrov made a statement that there were terrorists in Pankisi Gorge, 
Maia Urushadze, an expert in international affairs, wrote that the minister’s words can be 
interpreted in several ways.209 First, it is an attempt to discredit Georgia in the eyes of its 
Western partners. As a result, those partners would doubt that the Georgian government 
fully controls the situation in Pankisi. Second, by focusing on Pankisi Gorge, Russia tries 
to start an information warfare campaign against Georgia. Third, Russia may be 
preparing a basis for possible provocation and military operations against Georgia.  
Donald Jensen, a U.S. scholar who has studied the Kremlin’s information warfare, 
told the Voice of America Georgian Bureau that Lavrov’s statements were dangerous and 
could be used to justify intervention in Georgia. He thought Russia should not comment 
on Georgian internal security issues, unless Georgia asks it to. As Jensen explained, “If 
Russia claims that there are terrorists in Georgia and uses it to enter Pankisi, they could 
later tell everyone that it was an antiterrorist operation.”210 
Shota Utiashvili, the former head of an analytical department at the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs of Georgia, said that Lavrov’s statement was not just about Pankisi, it 
was a message for the entire Georgia. As he said, “for the second decade in a row, we 
have become accustomed to the fact that when Russia has claims against Georgia, they 
manipulate with Pankisi community and say that something is happening in Pankisi and 
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that ‘something is happening’ theoretically means that they have the right to use 
force.”211 
More experts talked about the possible military interventions in the years that 
followed. In 2018, colonel of the Security Reserve, Beso Aladashvili, said in an interview 
with a Georgian magazine Tbiliselebi that Russia is interested in Pankisi Gorge to move 
military operations from its territory to Georgia. Therefore, the issue of terrorists and 
militants is a continuous topic of discussion for them. Alasashvili thinks that it is 
important for Georgia to have close diplomatic ties with the United States and Turkey, to 
create defensive mechanisms for the prevention of Russia’s intervention.212 The same 
year, another expert Gia Khuhashvili said if there is destabilization in Pankisi Gorge, 
Russia could use the situation to its advantage for yet another military operation in 
Georgia.213 
Also in 2018, Areshidze, an expert in Caucasus issues, said that Russian 
information sources and political elites had created an image of Pankisi Gorge as a shelter 
for terrorists. Georgia spent years attempting to change that perception, but Russia still 
tries to present Pankisi Gorge as a troubled region to the international community.  
To sum up, the experts who have commented on the issue throughout the years 
agree on one thing: Russia can use destabilization in Pankisi Gorge to intervene in 
Georgia and justify its actions alleging a terrorism threat is coming from the valley.  
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the Pankisi Gorge as a springboard to fight each other and how Russia is trying to bring the fight against 
terrorists to the territory of Georgia], Tbiliselebi, January 22, 2018, 
http://tbiliselebi.ge/index.php?newsid=268452326. 
213 „თუ პანკისის ხეობაში დაძაბულობის კერა გაჩნდა, რუსეთი ამას ოსტატურად 
გამოიყენებს” [If there is a hotbed of tension in the Pankisi Gorge, Russia will use it skillfully], News, 
January 3, 2018, https://news.ge/2018/01/03/xeobaxuxashvili-pankisis-xeoba/. 
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The study has provided an insight into Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Georgia, 
specifically its disinformation campaign against Pankisi Gorge. This campaign is 
carefully tailored and specific to the region’s social, economic, ideological, and 
geopolitical context. A small region inhabited by a Muslim minority that struggles with 
religious extremism and borders Russia has become a perfect target.  
The disinformation campaign goes back to the beginning of the 2000s when 
Chechen rebels, who had settled in the region after the war with Russia in 1999, took 
control of Pankisi. Back then Russia blamed the Georgian government for its lack of 
action and threatened to intervene. With the help of the United States, Georgia managed 
to gain control of the region and has been working since then to solve the issue of 
extremism there. Russia’s earlier allegations about Pankisi Gorge being a “nest of 
terrorism” were based on those former events and served to create an impression that 
Georgia never really established peace in Pankisi Gorge. Instead, according to the 
Russian narrative, the situation in the valley has worsened throughout the years, and if in 
the beginning of the century there were Chechen rebels, now there are ISIS terrorist 
training camps in the valley. According to Russia’s narrative, Pankisi Gorge has become 
a sheltering and transit place for terrorists, allowing them to cross the border from 
Georgia to Chechnya and go all the way to Russia. Once they arrive in Russia, they will 
try to organize terrorist attacks on Russian territory.  
Russia’s narrative about Pankisi Gorge has not changed much in the past few 
years, especially when it comes to those media outlets that are either state-owned, pro-
Kremlin oriented, or indirectly connected to the government. They have continued to 
present Pankisi as a lawless region years after the military conflict was long resolved. As 
for more independent media outlets, their content was a mix of disinformation and 
truthful facts. But even when they published factual information, the context was still 
often focused on terrorism. In total there were only a couple of news stories in which 
Pankisi was not mentioned in connection with terrorists, extremists, or the Islamic State.  
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In the more recent past, Russia has focused on the issue of young locals that left 
Pankisi Gorge to fight with ISIS in Syria. Even though, Georgian officials said that the 
number of such fighters was not alarming, and it was, in fact, on the decline in recent 
years, Russian media sources claimed that Pankisi has become a huge contributor of 
fighters to ISIS. “A factory of terrorists”, “a nest of terrorism,” and “regional threat” are 
some of the descriptions that Russian media outlets have repeatedly used in headlines for 
stories about Pankisi Gorge. They have emphasized that the region poses a threat not only 
for Georgia, but for Russia, as terrorists would be able to cross the border, go to Russia, 
and organize attacks there. Therefore, it is a common threat for both countries and they 
should act in cooperation. According to the Russian narrative, other neighboring 
countries such as Turkey will not be able to help Georgia in the fight against terrorism, 
and Russia is the only nation that can solve the issue. Such a narrative serves to 
strengthen the stereotype that Russia is Georgia’s saviorjust as it was believed in the 
18th century when King Erekle II of Eastern Georgia signed the document with Russia 
that allowed Georgia to keep its territorial integrity.  
Another important issue that Russian media outlets have covered is why youth 
from Pankisi Gorge might be drawn to ISIS. The authors of these news stories discuss 
unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, and the rise of 
Wahhabismsomething that Georgian scholars name as contributing factors as well. But 
Russian media outlets also wrongfully present Pankisi Gorge as an “isolated,” “closed,” 
“dull” community, where “foreigners should not move around without a local guide” and 
where most people do not speak Georgian. Even though Pankisi Gorge has issues of 
integration, it is definitely not a closed or isolated region that strives for autonomy. 
Instead, it is a peaceful region where locals work to overcome the stereotypes that have 
been firmly established in Georgian and international society.  
The existing image of Pankisi Gorge makes it more difficult for locals to attract 
tourists or foreign investors that would contribute to the improvement of the economy in 
the valley and ensure a better quality of life. Because of its natural beauty and proximity 
to the capital, Pankisi Gorge has a great potential for tourism. But, because of its image, 
tourism in Pankisi Gorge has developed more slowly than in the rest of Georgia, 
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especially considering the fact that Russian tourists comprise a significant portion of 
foreign visitors to Georgia. In 2018 there were more than 1.4 million Russian tourists in 
Georgia and they spent over 1.8 billion Lari.214 If those tourists had read stories about 
Pankisi Gorge in Russian media, it is possible that most of them would not have chosen 
Pankisi as their travel destination.  
The stereotypes about Pankisi Gorge being a place of transit and shelter for 
terrorists, as well as a closed and isolated community, creates a lot of frustration among 
locals, especially the youth. They often have to prove that the region does not pose any 
threat to the country, it does not harbor terrorists, and that people living there are not 
“others.”215 As a result, locals feel marginalized and detached from the society and that 
leads to more frustration. Many families from the area have gone to Europe in search of a 
better life, especially after Georgia got a visa-free regime to Schengen countries in March 
2017.216  
Locals from Pankisi Gorge agree that it is in Russia’s interests to create a negative 
image of the region on an international level.217 Experts say that if Moscow successfully 
continues to spread disinformation about Pankisi, it might use the situation to Russia’s 
advantage in the future. During the August War, Russia claimed that it was protecting its 
citizens in South Ossetia from Georgia’s military aggression. Russia can use the same 
argument when it comes to Pankisi Gorge–protection of its citizens from the threat of 
terrorism escalating in the region. Some say that events in the beginning of the 2000s are 
clear examples of how Russia can use the “terrorism threat” as an argument to justify its 
actions, especially considering the strict antiterrorism policy that the country has. Back 
                                                 
214 Aka Zaqua, “რას დაკარგავს საქართველო რუსი ტურისტების სახით” [What Will Georgia 
Lose in the Form of Russian Tourists], On, June 22, 2019, https://rb.gy/spp3ve.  
215 Lela Kunchulia, “პანკისის სტიგმა” [Stigma of Pankisi], Radio Free Europe, March 14, 2018, 
https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/pankisis-stigma/29098155.html. 
216 Pankisi Community Radio, “მასობრივი მიგრაცია პანკისიდან - სკოლები 121-მა 
მოსწავლემ მიატოვა” [Mass Migration from Pankisi -121 Students Drop out of School]. 
https://radioway.ge/news/people/item/717-masobrivi-migrazia-pankisidan-skolebi-121-ma-mosxavlem-
miatova. 
217 Kunchulia, “პანკისის სტიგმა” [Stigma of Pankisi].  
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then the United States declared that even though there was a legitimate threat coming 
from Pankisi, it did not justify Russia’ intervention in any way.   
The majority of experts think that military intervention through Pankisi Gorge to 
Georgia is the most likely scenario. Russia could easily send groups of people into the 
region to create provocations. Their actions would be covered in Russian media outlets 
that have already presented Pankisi Gorge as a terrorism threat. Russia already has 
increased military presence throughout the country, especially in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Considering Pankisi’s proximity to Russia’s border, it would not be difficult for 
that country to bring in additional forces. Because of its intensive disinformation 
campaign, the Kremlin would have enough of a basis to call Russia’s intervention in 
Georgia an “anti-terrorist operation.”  
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